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1. The Principle 8uum cuique 
Taking up the question of justice we know in advance that our 
remarks cannot possibly satisfy everybody， for the notion of justice 
has such rich associations and is so emotionally loaded that it would 
be very difficult to take into account everyone's intuitions on the 
subject. 
According to the primary sense of the word， an unjust action is 
any action which violates somebody's rights and expectations sanctioned 
and recognized within a given group， and a just action is an action 





justice is reflected in the old Roman formula suum cuique. It is 
usually ascribed to Ulpian1J but it appears earlier， in Cicero's works. 
“Nam iustitia， quae suum cuique distribuit， quid pertinet ad deos，" 
says Cicero in his work De Natura Deorum.2) “Iustitia"-we read in 
the essay on virtues “animi est firmiter et constanter velle sua quem-
que iure meritoque habere et sponte nihil aliud sibi exigere."的
Both the recognition of rights and the justification of demands 
are relative to a particular norm. In the sam巴way，saying that some帽
thing is due to someone calls for a compliment: a reference to a 
principle on the basis of which this is somebody's due. With respect 
to this principle， the principle suum cuique is of s巴condarycharacter. 
Sometimes someone's claims are justified because of legal regulations， 
for instance， children might have a strong claim along with a feeling 
that they have been wronged if their father in his last will has not 
provided them with what they were entitled to by the laws of in-
heritance. Someone else， whose debtor had repaid the debt in the 
amount borrowed， might feel hurt because since the time of borrow-
ing， the money had devalued considerably. The debtor was perhaps 
legally justified but not morally so. Our claim is combined with a 
feeling of injustice when we learn that our neighbour， whom we had 
always wi1lingly helped， isworking against us. Here the expectation 
of reciprocal actions which leads to claims is based on the principle 
which commands us to render good for good， or at least not evil for 
good. Sometimes people recognize the right to compensation for th08e 
who have suffered for a cause. In countries which accept the princi-
ple that everybody should have the minimum necessary for survival， 
the unemployed wi1l have a sense of injustice when they cannot collect 
unemployment benefits， and even if they do collect， they might have 
this feeling， this time originating from the conviction in their group 
that a subsidy is not enough and people have the right to work to 
satisfy their need for activity. 
But legal and moral rules are not the only basis for claims that 
are justified， that is， recognized by a given society. Such a basis may 
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be formed by a promise， a commitment or a contract. That is why 
the question of keeping one's word is often discussed in connection 
with the notion of justice. 
VVe used the expressions “recognized rights" and “justified claims" 
in order to avoid relying exclusively on the unpredictable sense of 
injustice which people sometimes feel without any cause and which 
is characteristic of a certain type of personality. It is not always 
that we sympathize with someone who has the subjective feeling of 
having been wronged; we consider such a feeling to be justified if it 
is based on a norm which we recognize. 
Forcing young children to work in mines， which was a common 
practice in the 18th century， nowadays seems a great wrong to al 
those who r巴cognizechidren's right to a happy childhood and so recog-
nize the rule which states that children should not be subjected to 
fear and suffering such as must have been their lot in the darkness 
of the mines. It is difficult to say when exactly recognition of a rule 
becomes widespread enough for the rights and claims based on it to 
be considered justified. In any case， claims are not experiences that 
exclusively characterize matters of law， as Leon Petrazycki argues， 
neither in the common understanding of law， nor in that broader 
interpretation in which he tried to find a basis for the distinction 
between law and morality.4) 
VVithout such a basis of a norm observed in a given social group， 
B's feeling of having been wronged is not sufficient to decide that A 
did an injustice to him. It may， however， be considered necessary. 
VVe do not think that A was acting unjustly towards B if B did not 
experience a feeling of injustice， even though A did not respect B's 
rights; for instance， an employee who was entitled to but was not 
granted a furlough might not have a sense of injustice if， for family 
reasons， 1巴aveat that time would not have been convenient. 
Aristotle proclaimed what later became known as the principle 
volenti non fit iniuria. According to him an action desired by some-
one cannot be unjust towards this person. One cannot wrong oneself 
(3 ) 
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or do injustice to oneself. This principle stresses the psychological 
element present in this interpretation of justice. It does not let us 
consider as unjust the refusal to grant leave to an employee in the 
case quoted above. 
It follows from our discussion that the well known principle of 
justice in Roman law which demanded that everyone should be given 
his due， causes several difficulties in its interpretation. Kazimierz 
Ajdukiewicz had already expressed some doubts， asking whether we 
actually commit injustice when we do good to someone who does not 
deserve i t orwhether we are unjust whenever we withhold something 
from someone who deserves it as when， for instance， we let a child 
off a well deserved punishment or when we give up a legitimate 
reimbursement.5) 
2. The Principles of Justice as Principles of Distribution 
The notion of a just action as one which provides someone with 
something that is this person's (it can even provide with more， as 
long as it does not deprive som巴oneelse)， and of an unjust action as 
one which infriges upon someone's rights， isa notion with very broad， 
uncertain limits. There exists， however， another concept of justice 
which one might want to adopt; a concept which is associated with 
the distribution of goods or of burdens. 
Aristotle had this in mind when he distinguished a narrower 
meaning of the word ‘justiceア)the application of which required the 
existence of at least two people and at least two things. It was this 
sense of justice that Hume talked about when he claimed that people 
would have never arrived at the notion of justice if al goods were 
in abundance or if people were inclined to give them away freely. 
The statements by both the authors prove that while talking about 
justice they had distribution of goods in mind. According to Aristotle， 
distribution of goods was the subject of distributive justice， while the 
distribution of penalties was covered by compensative justice. Aris-
totle's distinct recognition of compensative justice was connected with 
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his view that a person who wronged somebody always gained some-
thing in th巴processand everyone who was wronged suffered a loss; a 
penalty served the purpose of equalizing the relations between the 
wrongdoer and the victim. Those for whom wrongdoing is not limited 
to loss of measurable goods， and punishment not limited to its com-
pensatory function， need not respect the distinction made by Aristotle 
and treat compensative justice separately from distributive justice. 
Distribution of punishment， that is distribution of evil， isas strongly 
developed in the human understanding of justice as distribution of 
goods. During the Nazi occupation some people used to say: “If 
Hitler wins， itwi11 mean that there is no God." Hitler's suicide and 
Germany's defeat were met with a sigh of relief not only because the 
sufferings of the war were over but also because people did not have 
to revise their Weltanschauung. 
As far as 1 know Duprるelwas the first to prove that the princi-
ples behind distributive justice occupy two different levels.7) This 
idea was further developed by Chaim Perelman.8) On the first level 
we have the directives which specify the criteria for the distribution 
of good and evil， and on the second level the principle which te11s us 
how those criteria should be applied. We sha11 now consider these 
two levels separately， starting with the directions of the lower level. 
Priciples which people fo11ow in the distribution of goods or burdens 
show a considerabl巴 variety.They are so well known that here 1 shall 
give only a few examples. 
When at times of food rationing infants get an additional allo-
wance of milk or oranges it is based on the directive: “To everyone 
according to his needs". When the same system of rationing caters 
only to those adults who work and leaves the non-workers to their 
own resources it does so on the basis on the rule: “To everyone 
according to his achievement". This rule also determines the wages 
of those who are paid by the job. When in our evaluation of the 
work of school children we take into account a difficult home situa-
tion or the lack of a quiet place for homework we evaluate according 
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to the students' efforts. Greater burden of responsibility shouldered 
by higher officials is compensated by better salaries， just as the risk 
and effort involved in working in the coal mines is rewarded by 
particularly good earnings. If nobody in a queue questions the rule 
“first come， first served"， itis because it is tacitly accepted that 
greater effort should result in reaching the goal sooner. If this order 
is disturbed when a woman carrying a child joins the queue， we can 
attribute it to the working of the same rule which includes the carry-
ing of a child in the total effort. 
1n the application of each of the above principles we encounter 
well known difficulties. The rule:“To everyone according to his 
needs"， isvery general， the particular needs under consideration have 
to be specified. It was sometimes used for the perpetuation of social 
inequalities by those who tried to justify their privileges on the 
grounds of having more complex needs. To avoid such dangers the 
needs were usually limited to basic， biological ones， for instance， the 
amount of food calories required， the number of hours of sleep， the 
length of vacation needed for the restoration of strength， etc.9) No-
body ever intended to take into account al possible human needs. 
Every culture， for example， sets limits to satisfaction of the need for 
aggression. Only the needs approved of by a given group are consi-
dered. 
It has been pointed out that the directive: “To everyone accord-
ing to the work performed"， presupposes that the different kinds of 
work are comparable. However， itis difficult to decide whether the 
work of an expert in industry or the work of an author of good 
novels is more important. 
Aristotle demanded that a certain proportion be preserved in the 
distribution of goods， that is， people who are not alike should not be 
given like shares and those who are alike should not be given unlike 
shares. “Alike" here refers to equality or inequality in a respect 
that is essential to the matter in question. As an illustration of the 
first case， we can quote the indirect taxes collected by the state 
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through taxation of salt or matches. They have been under attack 
because though they had an egalitarian appearance they affected the 
rich and the poor differently. Similarly， the often quoted prohibition 
against sleeping at railway stations had only the appearances of equa-
lity， since those who had the money undoubtedly preferred to spend 
the night elsewhere. 
3. The Principle of Justice as the Principle Governing 
the Application of Rules 
Before we come back to the connection between equality and 
justice we have to discuss the principle of justice which governs the 
application of principles of the kind we just described. Many consider 
this principle to be at th巴 veryheart of justice. It te11s us that once 
we have decided， in the distribution of good or evil， to fo11ow a 
certain standard such as the needs， the achievement， effort， etc.， we 
have to be completely consistent in applying it and not make excep-
tions for any individual. This principle was called “the principle of 
equal measure，" by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz， who formulated it as fol-
lows:“Nobody is entitled to anything just because of being this 
particular individual and not another. It is a priciple with a simple 
content， but it s巴emsto constitute the core of the sense of justice， 
the element which is likely to have been present in the sense of 
justice of a1 peoples and a1 ages; its lack is symptomatic of a com-
plete atrophy of a1 sense of moral justice".10) 
The principle of justice on the lower level can use a most bizarre 
criterion for assigning something to people. For instance， itcould 
specify that only people wearing gIasses are entitled to ride first 
class on a train. However， once this criterion is adopted， ithas to 
be applied uniformly to a1 passengers who wear glasses. If we decide 
that it is the grades on the high school certificate and the results of 
the written and oral entrance examinations which d巴terminethe ac-
ceptance or rejection of a co11ege candidate， the principle of justice 
which governs the application of the principles on the lower level 
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will not let us accept anyone just because he is the son of a state 
official or our good friend. 
When introducing the distinction between these two kinds of 
principles of justice Dupreel called the lower level ones the princi-
ples of dynamic justice， and the principles on the higher level-the 
principles of static justice. The reason was that while the former are 
constantly under criticism which results in incessant change， the 
principle of principles (r色gledes r色gles)remains the same owing to 
its formal characterP) According to Chaim P巴relman，the same rule 
states that one should treat in the same manner al beings which 
belong to the same principal category. The principles of justice on 
the lower level always imply a hierarchy of values. According to 
Dupreel， the egalitarian principle of justice: “The same for every-
one"， implies respect for human being as such， while the rule telling 
us to respect people's needs is an expression of a desire to prevent 
suffering. On the other hand， inChaim Perelman's opinion， the princi-
ple of principles does not imply any hierarchy of values. 
This view wouJd probably arouse the protest of al those who 
consider that lack of the principle of equal measure is a sign of the 
atrophy of al sense of moral justice. It seems that one of the values 
which find their expression in this principle is the value of consis-
tency str巴ssedby Leon Chwistek，12) for this rule reminds us of the 
directive which tells us that once we have determined th巴valueof a 
variable we should always substitute the same value for this variable. 
This directive is morally neutral. But here respect for consistency 
is not al， in practice this principle is involved in a struggle against 
privilege， for we refer to it whenever privilege threatens a particular 
distribution of good or evil. Nobody is seriously tempted to violate 
the directive about substituting the same value for the same variable. 
On the other hand， in case of the principle which was called the 
principle of equal measure by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz， one has to 
constantly struggle against such temptations. We are prompted to-
wards its violation by our egocentrism， the factor mentioned by 
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Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz， or a desire for personal gain， friendliness or 
gratitute towards some individuals and dislike for some others. When 
this principle checks our friendly impulses which encourage us towards 
being partial， we experience the quality of justice that is described as 
coldness. 
4. Justice and Equality 
As we just pointed out， the principle of equal measure as a 
principle which is directed against privilege (or possible neglect) is 
not axiologically neutral. Further consideration of this matter brings 
us to the problem which repeatedly appears in the literature on the 
subject， namely the problem of the relation between justice and equali-
ty. 
One of the suggestions made by Aristotle was to consider as 
unjust som巴onewho is the enemy of equality. “The demand for 
equality is built into the very concept of justiceぺ13) wri tes the con-
temporary ethicist William K. Frankena in his work on social justice. 
Here we should add that Aristotle， who called an unjust person 
an enemy of equality， himself believed in the principle:“to everyone 
according to his position". In his opinion， ifa man of rank strikes 
an ordinary citizen， the latter should not retaliate， but in a reverse 
situation， not only should a person of rank retaliate when attacked by 
a common man but， inaddition， the attacker should be punished. 
1 have quoted this detail to stress the fact that the principle of 
equal measure does not ensure respect for the precepts of democracy. 
Like Aristotle one can formulate different laws for different social 
class巴sbut at the same time insist that the principle of equal measure 
be applied within each class; that is， one can oppose privilege within 
what Chaim Perelman calls a principal category. Democracy can be 
achieved only when a lower level principle is combined with the 
principle of equal measure. By itself the principle of equal measure 
can be observed both when we determine that al citizens should 
receive primary education and when we exclude Negroes from it， as 
(9 ) 
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long as we take care that within those two categories nobody should 
be privileged or neglected just because of being John Smith or Joseph 
Brown. In the work quoted above， Chaim Perelman claims that， con-
trary to the common opinion equality does not constitute the basis of 
even formal justice， but is a consequence of membership within the 
cat巴goryunder consideration. Once we have decided， for instance， 
that those who do not work should not eat， that is， that we would 
base our criteria on the work performed， equality in our treatment 
of people becomes， according to Chaim Perelman， a logical consequence 
of their membership in the same category that is relevant at the 
given moment. If every child in a school is to get a drawing pad 
then Jack， Peter and Paul as students of that school should also each 
get one. However， inorder for them to get it， without anyone gett-
ing two just because he is the son of the principal， we have to put 
into effect the principle of equal measure which is not a logical con-
sequence of membership within the same category， iffor no other 
reason than the fact that directives do not automatically result from 
descriptive statements.H) Also psychologically， the awareness that 
people belong to the same principal category does not reduce people's 
desire to favour some individuals even at the cost of others. 
While to many theoreticians justice and equality appear insepar-
able， some perceiv巴 aconflict between the two. For instance， as we 
know from al the discussions of the program designed to equalize 
people's incomes， equality in this respect is often considered unjust 
because it is against the principle:“To everyone according to the 
work performed". The opponents of the levelling of income， usually 
themselves among the economically privileged， consider it unjust to 
treat equally people whose initiative， abilities and industry are not 
the same. Defending their stand they point out that the suggested 
equalization of income would kil initiative and the desire for work. 
At the same tim巴 theuse of economic incentive is seen by many as 
a sign that the ideal of justic巴 hasbeen abandoned. However， the 
foregoing of equal pay has not been followed by abandoning the idea 
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of equal chances at the start. In the effort to implement this diffi-
cult ideal the universities in Poland have introduced the system of 
additional points given at the entrance examinations to the children 
of peasants and blue collar workers， on the grounds that the candi-
dates coming from remote villages have less chance of getting through 
the examination sieve that the young people from the educated c1ass 
living in big cities where general intellectual accomplishment is easier 
to achieve. Clearly then， the ideal of equality and the notion of 
justice are somehow connected， but it should be emphasized once 
again that the principle of equal measure will not， by itself， ensure 
the implementation of this ideal， for which the participation of the 
first level principles is also required. The principle of equal measure 
would be observed when the universities set limits on the number of 
the sons of merchants accepted or when they followed the policy of 
'numerus c1ausus' for the coloured population or for the Jewish candi-
dates. What was objectionable was the fact of setting up those par-
ticular principal categories. 
5. Justitiαet Cαritαs 
Whi1e tradition has persistently linked justice with equality， it
has been seen a basic conf1ict between justice and charity. In Cicero's 
work， De Officiis， De Virtutibus one of the charact巴rs，J¥ulus， asks 
his companion:“Sed cur tu c1ementiam adiungis iustitiae， cum iustitia 
per se tam horribi1is et severa sit， ut nemo tantu~ sit， quem non 
terrore afficiat， si eum tetigerit， c1ementia autem tam dulcis et 
iucunda sit， ut confirmet et adiuvet timidos， quare mirum est coniun-
gere severitatem cum suavitate， quae duae res sibi sint contrariae?"問
In the second century J¥. D.， under the leadership of Marcion， a sect 
was formed within Christianity which “solved" the conf1ict between 
justice and charity by assigning them to two different gods. Love is 
biassed - say the contemporary moral philosophers - while justice 
has to be impartial. Justice has to adhere to a principle while love 
is spontaneous. “For justice an individual does not exist， justice can 
(11) 
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not regard him otherwise than as an element of a wholeぺsaysChaim 
Perelman. “]ustice cannot love for it can not favour". Dupreel sums 
it up succinctly:“]ustice is not merciful， mercy is not justぺ Any
solution to this conflict invariably leaves stings of conscience behind 
it. While one of the characters in Cicero's De Virtutibus insists that 
“at enim iustitia humane et liberaliter exercitata vocari potest cle-
mentia， nam liberalitas， pietas， humanitas proficiscuntur a clementia"問
we can at best mitigate the conflict but we can not eliminate it 
altogether. 
In his essay“The Norms of a Free Group"， Czeslaw Znamierowski 
sees no conflict between justice and universal friendliness， which he 
advocates.17) Quite the contrary， he sees universal friendliness as the 
best guarantee of justice. In my opinion， ifthis conf1ict seems to be 
solved it is only because the author's“universal friendliness" is some-
thing quite different from that warm feeling towards someone which 
encourages us to single out and to favour this particular individual. 
We do not deny that the principles of justice are dictated by good 
will and friendliness and by a desire to prevent conflicts， a desire 
which encompasses the totality of relations between people. If we do 
not consider particular emotional relations between A and B， but only 
concentrate on obtaining the best general results through proper con-
trols， we shall find that universal friendliness is indeed very close to 
justice~ However it sti!l holds true that in order to follow the dic-
tates of the latter one often has to act against one's inclinations. 
Certain rules to be observed during college entrance examinations 
have been created under the influence of general good wi!l， i. e. with 
the intention of taking into account general welfare. They will not， 
however， resolve the inner conflict of the examin巴rwho may be 
confronted with the despair of the rejected candidate or with the 
tears of the candidate's mother， but who ought not to be induced to 
violate the principle of justice dictated by universal friendliness. 
“And when men are friends they have no need for justiceぺwrote
Aristotle at the beginning of Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics and 
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further on:“一.and the truest form of justice is thought to be a 
friendly quality". However， even if A's friendship for B guarantees 
that A will not harm B， at the same time it presents a threat that 
A will harm C in order to please B. Nobody denies that the rules we 
have just discussed have been created with the intention to reduce 
the world's evils. Nevertheless， in their particular applications they 
force us into being inconsiderate towards the suffering of others. 
To Tadeusz Kotarbinski justice appears to contain an element of 
charity which lies in the fact that violation of equality of distribution 
would cause disappointment.18l However， itshould be stressed that it 
is not clear whether people feel disappointed more often when they 
have not been treated equally or when they have been so treated， for 
as we know， we al tend to perceive our particular situation as unique 
and therefore the principle of equal measure when applied to our case 
often seems unhuman and unjust. 
6. The Struggle for Social Justice 
The struggle for social justice could take any of the forms men-
tioned above， for instance， at times it was a demand for the expansion 
of the rights already recognized or for recognition of the rights 
which had not yet been accepted. An example of the former was the 
struggle for the enfranchisement of women or of any other under-
privileged group such as the Negroes. The demands for the right to 
work， to a paid vacation， to free education or old age security are 
al examples of strugg!e for the recognition of new rights. From the 
time of the “Dるclarationdes Droits de l'homme et du citoyen" of 
1789 til the“Declaration of Rights" of 1948 prepared by the United 
Nations， the number of proclaimed human rights incr巴asedtwofold. 
As another form of struggle for social justice we can mention a 
defence against violation of recognized rights which is committed by 
someone who enjoys greater physical strength or economic privilege. 
For instance， an employer can violate the rights of the workers by 
forcing them to work overtime without pay.“Nos vero"-says Cicero 
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in his work De Reρublica “iustissimi homines， qui Transalpinas 
gentis oleam et vitem serere non sinimus， que pluris sint nostra 
oliveta nostraquae vineae; quod cum faciamus， prodenter facere dici-
mur勺 9) This was the case when the powerful used their position to 
their advantage and to the disadvantage of others by violating their 
right to grow on their land something that everyone recognized as 
desirable. All exploitation is what it is because of certain rights 
which it violates， however， not al violation of human rights can be 
called exploitation. For instance， though we agree that an infant is 
entitled to care and protection we shal1 not describe as exploitation 
the actions of a mother who starves her baby in order to get rid of 
it. But we shall use the word ‘exploitation' to describe the behaviour 
of a man whose wife holds a ful time job and yet sti1l demands that 
she should cater to al his needs. 
We would not like to spend more time on semantic investigations 
because the word “exploitationぺwhichappeared a useful name for 
something against which we struggle when we fight for social justice， 
is not one of those words of which we could expect semantic preci司
slOn. 
Struggle against various inequalities is the third form of struggle 
for social justice. Sometimes it was directed against c1ass privi1ege， 
sometimes against too great differences in earnings. One of the most 
important tasks in this struggle was to expose privilege hiding under 
the guise of equality. As ear1y as in the 18th century there developed 
a great sensitivity to inequality of people before the law which was 
allegedly the same for everybody. As they would say， a strong pike 
wi1l always free itself from the net while the small fry will be 
caught. 
Those were the examples of the more important forms of strl1gg1e 
for social justice. This strl1gg1e did not involve that rule of justice 
which-following Dupreel-we have called the principle of principles. 
It concerned itself with the sph巴reof human rights and also involved 
the principles of justice from the lower level， such as the rule: “To 
(4) 
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everyone according to his needs" or“To everyone according to the 
work performedぺtherules which at times were supposed to be put 
into practice immediately and sometimes were relegated into the 
future and temporarily considered not very important or perhaps 
Utopian. 
7. Rules akin to the Principles of Justice 
The predicates“just" and “unjust" may designate actions as we11 
as principles. We did not bring this distinction into our considerations 
for in this matter we agree with Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz who was of 
the opinion that we could easily pass from one of these languages to 
the other and that no dangerous misunderstandings could arise from 
this ambiguity. 
In a1 the languages 1 know there exist popular sayings which 
remind us to listen to the voice of justice in our“evaluatiol1s" .“The 
pot ca11s the kettle black" says one of them. Another one， also known 
as the principle of clean hands warns: “Do not throw a stone at 
another if you are not without sin yourself." 
How should we interpret such sayings in order to give them a 
more scientific form? It appears to me that we could see in them 
the principle of equal measure applied to evaluation. This variant of 
the principle could have the form:“Always evaluate the same actions 
in the same manner." The principle thus formulated can be used to 
counteract the usual partiality of our attitude towards ourselves. “If 
you did not condemn your own behaviour， you cannot condemn the 
same behaviour in others".20) The fact that you made a mistake 
should not take away from you the right to condemn the same mistak巴
in others， but on the condition that you will also condemn your own 
mistake. It is worth noticing that， indefence against the charge of 
being unjust in this sense， people do not contradict the rule which 
te11s us to evaluate in the same manner for the same actions， but 
rather find an abundance of arguments meant to prove that in their 
particular case the actions were not the same and they are often 
(15) 
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sincerely convinced that their own situation is quite exceptiona1. 
The biblical saying;“Do not throw a stone at another if you are 
not without sin yourself" is often equated with the saying;“People 
who live in glass houses， should not throw stones." Whi1e both of 
these sayings imply that the person who condemns is also gui1ty， the 
latter version contains a warning that the weapon used against others 
can turn against its user because glass walls do not provide sufficient 
protection against stones. 
8. A Few Psychological and Sociological Remarks 
about Justice 
E. de Greeff， a man whose broad education also included psychia-
try， studied about 1200 children from 10 to 15 years old， asking them 
how they would distribute particular goods if they were al1 powerful. 
The answers showed that al1 the respondents thought it perfect1y 
natural to give more to those whom they liked and less to those 
whom they did not like.21) Another trait characteristic of our atti-
tude towards the rules of justice is the difference in our treatment 
of others and of ourselves. According to the author， the notion of 
justice is egocentric and aimed at selfdefence. Normally we do not 
have doubts as to the way in which we decide what is just and what 
is unjust， and we are usually able to justify our actions no matter 
what they are. In matters of retributive justice， those who have been 
punished usually consider themselves to be victims of fate and it is 
seldom possible to evoke in them the feelings of guilt. Those who 
fight for justice are usually motivated by personal wrong they have 
experienced. We can talk about the virtue of justice only when 
someone is willing to accept certain limitations because of considera-
tion towards others. 
Whi1e we do not want to go into the detai1s of the contents and 
of the scope of these studies or into the problem what it was actually 
investigated in the study of the attitudes towards justice， we should 
emphasize that the author's observation of differences in the remorse 
(6) 
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generating properties of various offences against moral principles 
deserves attention and further verification. Possibly this absence of 
guilt is here partly due to an abundance of possibilities for rationali-
zation which justify our privileges. The 18th century rationalized the 
existence of the poor and the rich as a wise disposition of Providence， 
for the rich needed the poor for their hard labour and the poor 
needed the rich to be employed. Any pangs of conscience could also 
be assuaged by interpreting privileges as a reward for merit and 
ascribing the poverty of the underprivileged to sloth and lack of 
ambition. All those views which served as the means of selfdeception 
are widely known. In general when it comes to justifying their own 
actions people show remarkable ingenuity， but possibly， as E. de Gre句
eff would say it， the sphere of justice is particularly suitable for its 
display. 
Talking about the principles of justice of the lower level we have 
said that they could have different， often debatable meanings. But 
the principle of principles， which we have called the principle of equal 
measure， seemed so uncontroversial that we were inclined to ascribe 
to it universality without reservations. However， itappears from the 
work of some cultural anthropologists that this principle does not 
have wide application in small primitive societies. For instance， the 
distribution of game proceeds according to strict， clearly formulated 
rules: these particular portions， in given quantity， go to the sister 
and her sons， those to the mother etc. Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz for-
mulated this principle as follows:“Nobody is entitled to anything 
just because of being this particular individual and not another." But 
here， apparently， the fact that someone is this particular individual 
and not another determines the way in which goods are distributed. 
However， this violation of the principle of equal measure seems 
to be only apparent， for the distribution is determined not by persons 
but by their social roles. This much is due to mother as mother， not 
as a particular individual， and within this basic category， as Chaim 
Perelman calls it， the principle of equal measure stil holds true. On 
(17) 
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the other hand it is not ruled out in western culture that association 
of justice with equality has been given a special position. According 
to a well known opinion this association is upheld mainly by the weak 
who gladly abandon the ideal of equality as they themselves join the 
powerful，“for the weaker are always asking for equality and justice， 
but the stronger care for none of these things"，22) as Aristotle wrote 
in his Politics. 
Footnotes 
1) Ulpian's definition of justice:“Honeste vivere， neminem laedere， suum 
cuique tribuere". 
2) T. M. Cicero， De Natura Deorum， Boston， 1973， p.148. 
3) T. M. Cicero， De Officiis. De Virtutibus， Leipzig， 1971， p.126. 
4) M. Ossowska， Norma prawna i norma moralna u Petrazyckiego (The 
Legal Norm and Moral Norm according to Petrazycki)， in: Socjologia 
moralnosci. Zarys zagadnie白(Sociologyof Morals. An Outline of Theory)， 
Warszawa， 1969. 
5) K. Ajdukiewicz， 0 sprawiedliwo五ci(On Justice)， in: Jezyk i poznanie 
(Language and Cognition)， Vol. J， Warszawa， 1960. 
6) See Aristotle， Nicomachean Ethics， Book V. 
7) E. Dupreel， Traite de Morale， Vol. IT， Part N， Chapter皿， p. 142. 
8) Ch. Perelman， The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument， 
London， 1963. 
9) See Ch. Perelman， ibid.， p.24-25. 
10) K. Ajdukiewicz， 0 sprawiedliwosci (On Justice)， op. cit.， p.117. 
11) E. Dupr白1，Traite de Morale， Vol. IT， Part m， Chapter m， La Justice. 
12) L. Chwistek， Rola zasady konsekwencji w zagadnieniu sprawiedliwosci 
spolecznej (The Role of a Principle of Consistency in the Problem of 
Social Justice)， Krakow， 1936; F. Rauh talks about “devoir de la non. 
contradiction". 
13) W. K. Frankena， The Concept of Social Justice， in: Social Justice， ed. 
R. Brandt， New York， 1962， p.20. 
14) The statement about belonging to the same category is a descriptive 
one from which we cannot pass to the directive to give an equal treat. 
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ment to al the members of this category. 
15) M. T. Cicero， De Officiis. De Virtutibus， Leipzig 1971， p.126-127. 
16) Ibid.， p.127. 
17) C. Znamierowski， Normy grupy wolnej (The Norms of a Free Group)， 
in: Mysl Wspolczesna， Krakow， 1947. 
18) T. Kotarbi白ski，0 etyce niezaleznej (On Independent Ethics)， in: Kro-
nika， Nov巴mber1956; T. KotarbiIlski， Idea wolnosci (The Idea of Free-
dom)， in: Wybor pism， Vol. J， Warszawa， 1957. 
19) M. T. Cicero， De Republica， Leipzig， 1969， p.88. 
20) A question arises here how to interpret this “cannot". It is clear that 
is not the matter of technical inability， but the problem of trespassing 
some principle of consistency or some moral principle which is not 
precisely formulated. 
21) E. de Greeff， Les instincts de defense et de sympathie， Paris， 1947， 
Chapter 1: La structure affective de la notion de justice. 
22) Aristotle， Politica. Translated by Benjamin Jowett， in: W. D. Ross (edふ
The Works of Aristotle， Vol. 10， Oxford 1921， p.1318. 
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